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Abstract
In today’s Internet world, web pages are facing a severe threat which uses the 
client-side browser attacks. The vulnerability-based attacks are based on client-side 
application which becomes the major threat to web pages. The spread of malware 
uses software vulnerabilities which attack the client application sending request 
to the server if whether the attack has occurred. This detection is based on client 
honeypot which detects the various malicious program linked with web pages. 
Client honeypots are active security devices in search of malicious servers that 
attack clients. The client honeypot poses as a client and interacts with the server to 
examine whether an attack has occurred. Often the focus of client honeypots is on 
web browsers, but any client that interacts with servers can be part of client honey-
pot. In this research paper, we propose a model of detecting embedded web pages 
using client honeypot.
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1. Introduction
The Internet has become the most popular medium where the increasing new 
trend has availability of spreading attacks. There are existing attacks as firewalls 
and intrusion detection system, and honeypot is also one of the technology-based 
security attacks. Here honeypots are playing a big role in security attacks, and it 
is a new kind of attacks on the cyber space. There are many attacks in the area of 
security. Honeypots refer to closely monitoring system which needs to be attacked. 
To supplement a new value it must be compromised, attacked by cyber crimes on 
honeypot.
Honeypots are based on servers which will not be able to detect the client-side 
applications in web pages. Honeypots crawl the network of any firewall that attacks 
the client. There are two attacks: client and server. Server honeypots is a traditional 
honeypot, whereas client honeypot is based on client-side scripting on web pages. 
This attack detects the attack from the client side which is vulnerable on the cli-
ent side. It needs a source and visits and detects all activities. It spreads malware 
through the vulnerability in the client-side attack. Here we are using only client 
honeypot and vulnerability-based attack. The vulnerability is based on exploiting 
the attack where the security detects the services exposing on attacking the system.
Client honeypots crawl the network, interact with servers, and classify servers 
with malicious web pages. It does not expose server-based attacks on the client-side 
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attack. They have some kind of exposed attack which is vulnerable to the sender 
and receiver. They can be detected, if they are passive.
2. Proposed work
The security resources are production value; no resources should communicate 
between each other. Honeypot is compromised for outbound connections on the 
web pages. Honeypot collects all information about the intruder or intermediate 
where the community is targeting to attack. And they list the type of resources 
attack on the network security. Honeypots play the big role on the attacker side 
scripting based on web pages in client-side attack. Client honeypots are also called 
as active honeypots or honey client. It visits the web page as requested by the 
attacker and visits the web page to check whether the attack has happened or not 
[1–3] (Figure 1).
3. Client honeypots
A honeypot is one of the security technologies that helps an organization to 
catch viruses, malware, or attackers, and it acts as an alarm system that discovers 
the attempts to attack a network. Honeypot technology is defined as a “security 
resource whose value lies in being investigated, attacked, or compromised” [1]. 
The types of honeypot are active and passive. A technology that passively waits for 
attacks to detect them are called passive honeypot. Active honeypot also called as 
client honeypot that interacts with a target web page to find its possible effect on the 
honeyware.
4. Architecture
The client honeypot architecture is separated into three components, namely, 
queuer, the client, and analysis engine. A queuer is a process of creating a list of 
servers for the client to visit. A client who can able to create request to servers is rec-
ognized by the queuer. An analysis engine is a process of identifying an attack pro-
cessing in client honeypot. Along with all the above components, client honeypot 
Figure 1. 
Client honeypot classifications.
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is furnished with some kind of approach to avoid successful attacks from exploring 
beyond the client honeypot [4, 5]. Analog to traditional server and client honeypots 
are classified by their high- or low-interaction level that denotes the client honeypot 
make utilize of functional interaction the server. This is a newly hybrid approach 
that uses both high- and low-interaction detection techniques (Figure 2).
5. Client honeypot solutions
5.1 High-interaction client honeypots
High-interaction client honeypot is a real application installed on the real 
systems. Real browsers and plug-ins are being browsed by the websites. Attacks are 
detected by checking the state of the process after a server interaction. Capture dif-
ferentiates from existing client honeypots in different ways. It is designed to be fast 
and to be scalable. Event-based model allow to know the detection of state changes. 
A main capture server can able to manage several clients across the network.
Honeyclient is a web browser. It is an open-source honeypot and a mix of perl, c++. 
It detects attacks on Windows client by registry entries, monitoring files, and processed 
events. It included the capture-HPC. It also contains a crawler, so that it can be sowed 
with a list of URLs from start and continues to exchange web pages in search of client-
side malware. HoneyMonkey is also a web browser. It is not an open source. It detects 
attacks on Windows client by registry entries, monitoring files, and processed events. 
It is a layered approach to communicate with servers to identify zero-day exploits. If 
the attack is still identified, one can complete the attack as no patch has been publicly 
released and it is dangerous [6–8]. SHELIA is a combination of the process of email 
received and email reader. It opens different client applications depending on the type 
of URL or the received attachment. It observes the executable instructions that are 
processing in data area of memory that indicates a buffer. UW Spycrawler is integrated; 
with the web browser like Mozilla, it cannot be downloaded. It detects attacks on 
Windows client by registry entries, monitoring files, browser crashes, and processed 





time period of the virtual machine. It is a process to overcome time bombs. WEF is an 
automatic implementation of drive by download that detects in virtualized environ-
ment. WEF is used as an active HoneyNet with overall simulated architecture beneath 
for rollbacks of compromised virtual machines.
5.2 Low-interaction honeyclient
Low-interaction honeyclient is different from high-interaction honeyclient in 
that they do not use the entire real system. But it uses lightweight or simulated cli-
ents to communicate with the server. Responses received from servers are scanned 
directly to consider whether an attack has been taking place or not. It is a platform-
independent open-source framework written in Ruby [11]. It concentrates on 
driving a web browser emulator which interacts with the server. Mischievous server 
is identified by statically investigative the web server’s response for mischievous 
string through the usage of snort signatures. Honeyclient uses many existing freely 
available open-source software systems. It consists of the following components:
5.2.1 Queue/seed generation
It is a source of initial set of seed URLs.
5.2.2 Web search seeding
The three web search engine application interface are Google, Yahoo, and MSN 
which are common keywords.
5.2.3 Spam trap seeding
Spam mails are extracted from URLs and are enlisted.
5.2.4 Blacklist seeding
It is a tool designed to automatically download blacklist from major blacklist 
workers and seed for crawler [12, 13].
5.2.5 Web crawling
Heritrix crawler is simulated into the monkey spider prototype with two param-
eters predefined:
• Maximum link hops which counts the connections to be included in crawl
• Maximum transitive hops which count the URLs extracted from seeded URLs
5.2.6 Content/malware analysis
5.2.6.1 Static analysis
The contents that are downloaded from the URL are scanned by ClamAV 
antivirus and it alerts using pattern matching. The terminology is provided for the 
downloaded binary [14, 15].
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5.2.6.2 Dynamic analysis
Malware analysis tool like CWSandbox is performed [16].
It is implemented to copycat the behavior of a user-driven network client 
application and abused by an attacker’s content. It is a virtual honeyclient which 
means that it is not a real application but it is an emulated client. It performs 
dynamic analysis of JavaScript and visual basic scripts to delete the complication 
from malicious pages. To analyze the malicious content, complication or encrypted 
JS is decrypted and reanalyzed. SPYBYE allows a web master to identify whether a 
website is eroded by a set of heuristics and scanning of data against the clamAV. It 
is a tool that communicates with a URL that is integrated with a web browser 
through its user agent field and downloading the response of the target website. The 
response is exploited using the scan engine [17, 18].
5.3 Problem statement
The problem explained in this paper is to identifying and extracting malicious 
web programs combined into malicious websites on the client honeypot technol-
ogy. It is used to address the problem to determine malicious websites based on the 
maliciousness inside the websites. It helps to rectify the difficulty of identifying 
whether we need to visit the website or not. Client honeypot technology can able to 
identify the client-side attacks by surfing the web pages [19, 20].
During the implementation, the steps of generic algorithm are used in the URL 
separation and feed within the virtual machine for visit:
1. List of URL to be visited, say N numericals of URLs.
2. Store the list of URLs into the database.
3. Get the URL one by one from mysql database.
Figure 3 represents the process of the system listing websites which have been 
presented as having visited a true browser on a client honeypots. By using clean 
machine of client honeypots, after visiting the clean website taking snapshot of that 
machine and store the log created at the stage of website visit.
System logs are created in client machine that are analyzed using third-party 
analyzing tool like antiviruses to identify the contagions on the list of collected 
logs.
Figure 3. 
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6. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a study of current solution of client honeypots for 
identifying the mischievous websites, and it is not applicable for closely bound and 
public users. So we propose a system which is able to identify the malware platforms 
with the help of client honeypot and put on the clever forensic inquiry of the col-
lected network data.
© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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